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Abstract 
Using panel data for Norwegian schools, we establish a two-equation supply and demand 
model for teachers with approved education. Taking into account nationally determined 
teacher pay and a strict teacher appointment rule, the data enable us to separately estimate 
supply and demand functions for certified teachers. The results clearly indicate that the 
student body composition, and in particular students belonging to ethnic minorities, influences 
both teacher supply and teacher demand. The implied negative relationship between excess 
demand for certified teachers and the share of minority students is likely to be important for 
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1. Introduction 
 
School reform proposals with increased parental school choice as an important element is 
widely debated among economists and politicians. Possible student segregation effects of 
choice based reforms are central in this discussion. Much less attention has been given to the 
ways teachers sort themselves across schools. Conventional wisdom combined with some 
anecdotal evidence says that teachers emphasize the student body composition when deciding 
which school to attend [Ladd and Fiske (2001)]. Little scientific evidence exists that can 
confirm these conjectures. In the present paper, we undertake an empirical analysis on the 
relationship between teacher sorting and the student body composition. The major 
contributions of the analysis are that it seeks to separate the effects of student body 
composition on teacher supply and teacher demand, and how the composition affects teacher 
quality. 
 
Several authors have examined the relationship between teacher quality and teacher pay in the 
US and routinely included variables intended to measure student composition such as the 
percentage of minority students, the percentage of students eligible for school lunch 
programs, and the poverty rate. These variables have merely been included as control 
variables to account for possible compensating wage differentials (see, e.g., Figlio, 1997, 
Ballou and Podgorsky, 1998 and Hanushek et al., 1999). Another, but closely related 
literature, initiated by Antos and Rosen (1975), directly focuses on the relationship between 
teacher wages and student composition. It derives implicit prices that teachers demand for 
teaching different types of students, that is, the extent of compensating differentials related to 
student composition. While both types of studies may reveal information on the relationship 
between teacher quality and student composition, the estimated equations are reduced form 
relationships and confound both underlying demand and supply forces in the teacher labour 
market. In addition, the assumption of perfect competition made in the literature on 
compensating wage differentials may be unrealistic in the teacher labour market given the 
existence of strong teacher trade unions on the supply side and political entities on the 
demand side. 
 
We utilize a system with strong national restrictions on wage setting and hiring practices in 
Norwegian schools that allows us to separately identify the effects of student composition on 
the supply and demand for teachers without identifying the wage elasticities that would be 
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required in a conventional setting. In particular, we exploit the fact that teacher pay setting has 
been completely centralized combined with a legal rule that applicants without formal 
certification can only be appointed in a teacher position when no certified teachers apply or is 
willing to take the job. Using data on the number of fulltime-equivalent certified and non-
certified teachers in Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools, we are able to separate 
the effects of student composition on teacher demand and teacher supply. In addition, we will 
argue that the number of certified teachers per teacher position, a ratio that is determined by 
supply and demand, is a reasonable measure of teacher quality. In estimating the effects of 
student composition on teacher supply, teacher demand, and teacher quality, we will address 
the issue of endogenous parental school choice and omitted variables by estimating several 
versions of the models, including models with fixed school effects and models using 
instrumental variables methods.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The following section describes how teacher supply and 
teacher demand is identified, and discusses the relevance of our measure of teacher quality. 
Section 3 depicts the empirical approach while section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results and section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Institutions and identification strategy 
 
A fundamental problem in the literature on teacher quality is how to obtain separate 
identification of supply and demand of teachers. In this section we presents the institutional 
features that makes it possible to identify the shifts in teacher supply and demand generated 
by variations in student composition, without identifying the wage elasticities, which would 
be required in a conventional setting. In addition to describing our basic identification 
strategy, we will discuss how these institutional features can be used to construct a reasonable 
teacher quality measure simply based on supply and demand.  
 
Public primary and lower secondary education in Norway (first through tenth grade), free of 
charge for the users, is the responsibility of the local governments. Norwegian local 
governments are multipurpose institutions, providing a large number of services, such as day 
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care and care for the elderly, in addition to education.1 There are usually several public 
schools within each local government, and private schools are quite rare and do not represent 
a realistic alternative to public schools. Parental school choice between public schools for 
given residence is not allowed.  
 
Two distinct features of the teacher labour market enable us to separately identify the supply 
and demand for teachers. First, in the period covered in this paper, teacher wages and 
workload were completely determined in central bargains between the teacher union and the 
central government. In a given year, the teacher wage was solely determined by the amount of 
formal education and teaching experience.2 This national contract effectively prevents schools 
and school districts from using wage policy to attract teachers.3 In addition, teacher workload, 
the number of instruction hours per full-time equivalent teacher, is regulated in the national 
contracts.  
 
Secondly, in vacant teacher positions, the best-qualified applicant has to be appointed. By 
law, certified teachers shall be considered as better qualified than individuals without a 
teacher certificate.4 Only in cases when it is impossible to hire certified teachers can and shall 
non-certified teachers be employed. According to the national contract, representatives of the 
teacher union must be informed prior to every hiring decision. In this way the union is able to 
closely monitor that the schools act in accordance with the rule, which have been one of the 
cornerstones in the teacher trade union policy.5  Moreover, non-certified teachers can only be 
hired on short-term contracts up to one year. Thus, the employment of non-certified teachers 
                                                 
1 Spending on primary and lower secondary education accounts for about 30% of total local government 
spending while spending on care for the elderly, preschool education, cultural services, infrastructure services 
and administration accounts for the rest.  
2 Many European countries have very centralized teacher wage setting; countries like France, Germany, Italy and 
the UK have basically a common wage schedule across schools, implying that an individual teacher is paid the 
same independent of the choice of school. 
3 There is one exception from the uniform wage. Some schools in the northern part of the country with 
particularly severe teacher shortage are allowed to pay about 10% higher wages, see Falch (2001). The empirical 
results in this paper are independent of the handling of these schools. Further, a limited amount of local wage 
flexibility was introduced in 2001. 
4 Teacher certification requirements are nationally regulated. There are mainly two ways to be certified. First, 
and most commonly, students who complete three or four years of study at special colleges (teacher colleges) are 
automatically certified to teach in primary and lower secondary schools. Second, individuals with university 
bachelor or master degrees with additional courses in education issues are certified to teach in lower secondary 
schools. In addition, individuals educated to take care of preschool children may obtain a certificate to teach in 
the lowest four grades if they take a special one-year course in pedagogy for young students.  
5 The local government is the formal employer of teachers, but hiring decisions are made by the school principal 
at each school and the teachers apply for jobs at the separate schools.  
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in a given school year reflects the state of the supply and demand of teachers that specific 
year. 
 
While the regulations described may seem inefficient for economists, elements of such 
regulations are present in most developed countries. The important point in this paper is that 
the regulations can be used for identification. In our data, we have information both on the 
number of full-time equivalent certified teachers and the number of full-time equivalent non-
certified teachers. Given the clear-cut rules, non-certified teachers can only be hired and 
observed in the data when it is impossible to attract certified teachers. Figure 1 illustrates the 
identification issue. The figure considers two schools with similar (inelastic) teacher demand, 
but different teacher supply. Given the centrally determined wage WC, there is excess demand 
in school A. The supply is lower than the demand, and the school will not be able to fill all 
teacher positions with certified teachers. The school has to rely on non-certified teachers, and 
the teacher supply LSA* is identified. In the data, the teacher supply is simply given by the 
number of full-time equivalent certified teachers given that the school has to employ non-
certified teachers. For school B the supply is greater than the demand, the school does not 
employ non-certified teachers, and the supply is not identified.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
School B in Figure 1 illustrates that teacher demand LDB* is identified in schools not relying 
on non-certified teachers. In addition, if non-certified teachers can always be hired, and 
teacher demand is independent of the level of teacher supply as drawn in Figure 1, teacher 
demand is also identified at schools with excess demand simply as the total number of 
teachers (certified plus non-certified full-time equivalent teachers). Casual observations 
clearly indicate that it is always possible to hire non-certified teachers at the centrally 
determined wage level, and in the following we assume that supply of non-certified teachers 
is perfectly elastic over the relevant range. However, the assumption that labour demand is 
independent of the degree of excess demand may be an oversimplification. First, the wages of 
non-certified teachers are lower than the wages of certified teachers, and hence total teacher 
demand can be higher under excess demand because teachers are then cheaper at the margin. 
Second, if schools value certified and non-certified teachers differently, a single demand 
curve for teachers may not exist. If these arguments are important, it implies that for each 
observation we can only identify either supply or demand, whichever represents the short side 
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of the market. However, our understanding of the working of school policy in Norway is that 
local politicians to a large extent value schooling by teacher employment rather than by 
student achievement, which implies that demand does not respond to supply factors. 
Nevertheless, in the empirical analysis below we will investigate whether the size of the 
coefficients in the teacher demand equation depend on whether there is excess demand or not. 
 
Our measure of teacher quality is the ratio between teacher supply and teacher demand. 
Define the quality Q as 
( )
( ) ( ),
LS X
Q h X Z
LD Z
= =                        (1) 
where X and Z are vectors of variables influencing supply and demand, respectively, and 
which may have common elements. Q can be interpreted as the supply of certified teachers 
per teacher position and is related to the more familiar concept applicants per position used in 
Krueger (1988) and Holzer et al. (1991) in their analysis of job queues. When Q is high more 
efficient matches between employer requirements and employees are made compared to the 
situation where Q is low. Variation in this variable could then be seen as a measure of the 
variation in average teacher quality across schools. Utilizing data on certified and non-
certified teachers, we observe Q when Q < 1, i.e., there is excess demand for teachers. While 
the determinants of teacher quality can be separated into supply and demand forces as 
sketched above, teacher quality can also be analysed directly as a sort of reduced form of the 
teacher labour market outcomes. 
 
Using the share of the teachers that are certified as a measure of teacher quality warrant some 
discussion. The US evidence may suggest that formal teacher education is a poor measure of 
teacher quality.6 It should be noted however, that a large part of this evidence comes from 
studies that apply the fraction of teachers with a master’s degree as a measure of teacher 
education, and this measure may be too crude to capture the effects of non-certified teachers. 
                                                 
6 Hanushek (1986) reports on 106 education production function studies that include measures of teacher 
educational level. Only 11 of these studies reveal statistically significant relationships between student 
achievement and teacher education, and five of these have a negative (i.e., “wrong”) sign. Monk (1994) provides 
some evidence that teacher preparation is characterized by diminishing marginal returns or threshold effects, 
indicating that a measure based on certification may make more sense. Moreover, Monk finds that course work 
in pedagogy contributes positively to student learning, which is interesting because a fraction of the non-certified 
teachers in our sample have university education, but lack the required pedagogy courses. Goldhaber and Brewer 
(2000) find that students achieve at higher levels in mathematics when they have teachers who hold standard 
certification in mathematics, but on the other hand, students who have teachers with emergency credentials do no 
worse than students whose teachers have standard teaching credentials. 
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Moreover, most of the existing studies do not take the endogeneity of teacher characteristics 
into account.7   
 
Ideally, one would like to test whether teacher certification has an impact on student 
achievement, while treating teacher qualifications as endogenous because teacher supply may 
be affected by the student composition. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Based on data for Norway from the recent Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) undertaken by OECD, we have instead undertaken a simple correlation analysis. The 
PISA study was executed in 2000. Students in 32 countries were tested in reading, science and 
mathematics. Questionnaires of the participating students and their school principals include a 
large amount of information. We will focus on the proportion of the teachers that is certified 
as calculated by OECD, which corresponds to variable Q above. Table 1 presents some 
correlation measures. The simple correlation between Q and student achievement in reading, 
mathematics and science, as reported in the last row of Table 1, is 0.19, 0.16 and 0.28, 
respectively, and significant at the 5 percent level for all subjects.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
To further address this issue, we estimate an equation with test score as the dependent 
variable and the share of certified teachers, school size and the student-teacher ratio as 
explanatory variables. The results from these specifications are reported in columns (1), (3) 
and (5) in Table 1. Achievement seems to be positively related to schools size, while the 
student-teacher ratio has a negative but clearly insignificant effect. Q has a positive effect in 
all cases, although the effect is significant only in mathematics. The magnitude of the 
coefficient implies that an increase in Q from 0.5 to unity is associated with an increase in 
achievement of 0.5 standard deviations in reading and science, and 0.8 standard deviations in 
mathematics. Columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 1 report the results from a specification where 
the degree of certification is entered as a dummy variable taking a value of unity when Q=1. 
The results show that achievement is significantly higher in schools with Q = 1 than in 
schools with Q<1 in all subjects tested.  
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, we do not have much systematic information on the characteristics of non-certified teachers in 
Norwegian schools. Information from the central register of teachers (“Statens sentrale tjenestemannsregister for 
skoleverket”) for  the school year 1999/2000 show that 31.6 (11.6) percent of the non-certified (certified) 
teachers was below 30 years of age.  Moreover, seniority was much lower among the non-certified teachers 
compared to the certified teachers. These figures may suggest that a significant share of the non-certified 
teachers go to college or to another job after having served as teachers one or a few years. 
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The analysis in Table 1 should be seen merely as a multivariate correlation analysis and 
should not be taken as decisive evidence about the superiority of certified teachers relatively 
to non-certified teachers. But the results are consistent with the claim made above that Q is a 
reasonable measure of teacher quality.     
 
Our teacher quality measure clearly illustrates that student composition may influence teacher 
quality via two different channels. To take a stylised example, consider a school where the 
supply of teachers initially equals demand. The school faces a large increase in the number of 
children from ethnic minorities qualified for special training according to the law. This will 
require more teachers and thus induce a positive shift in the demand curve. At the same time, 
if a higher share of such students is associated with less favourable working conditions for 
teachers, this may induce a negative shift in the supply curve. Since the school is faced with a 
fixed wage rate, this change in student composition will create excess demand for teachers, 
and non-certified teachers will in the Norwegian case fill the vacant teacher jobs. 
 
 
3. Empirical specification of demand and supply  
 
3.1. Teacher demand 8 
Specification of the empirical equations requires a discussion of the relevant characteristics of 
the Norwegian school system and the decision-making process on the allocation of 
educational resources.  
 
The key variable determining teacher demand is the number of teacher education hours, 
denoted U, which is subject to several national regulations. Following the resource allocation 
formula used by the local governments, U is the sum of three different components. First, the 
local governments must provide a minimum number of teacher education hours at the schools, 
denoted UM, which is determined by enrolment and a rule on maximum class size (28 
students per class in primary education and 30 students per class in lower secondary 
                                                 
8 The demand for education services has been addressed in a large empirical literature, e.g., Barlow (1970), 
Romer et al. (1992), Hoxby (1996) and Falch and Rattsø (1999). 
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education).9 UM is clearly beyond the control of the local governments and the maximum 
class size rule imply that it varies exogenously across schools.  Second, the local governments 
are required to provide extra resources for children with special needs and children from 
ethnic minorities, usually taking the form as extra instructional support. Accordingly an 
amount of U is explicitly targeted to satisfy these requirements.10 Finally, the local 
governments can freely allocate additional teacher education hours to the school in order to, 
e.g., divide classes into separate groups with separate teachers. A strict interpretation of the 
resource allocation formula would imply that teacher education hours targeted towards 
specific students corresponds to national regulations. However, in practice the local 
governments have substantial discretion on how to implement these national requirements. A 
local government may fulfil the national requirements by various support to students with 
special needs and from ethnic minorities. Thus, teacher education hours U in excess of UM 
must be seen as locally decided.  
 
To abstract as much as possible from local government behaviour, we include time specific 
local government fixed effects in the model. Based on this framework, an empirical model of 
teacher demand measured in per student terms can be written (subscript i denotes school, j 
denotes local government and t denotes year):  
 
1 2 3ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / )
LD LD LD
ijt t ijt ijt ijt ijt jt ijtLD P LD U U P K UM P SC Zα α α λ ε= + = + + + + + (2) 
 
Teacher demand (LD) per student (P) is decomposed into the number of teachers per teacher 
education hour (LD/U) and teacher education hours per student (U/P). LD/U can be 
interpreted as the inverse of the workload per teacher, which is centrally regulated, but differs 
                                                 
9 UM is formally decided by the formula UM=k1P + k2Cl, where P is the number of students, Cl is the number of 
classes, and k1 and k2 are parameters decided by the central government. The number of classes is determined by 
enrolment and the rule on maximum class sizes.  
10 Students whose parents speak a foreign language have the right to additional language instruction until they 
have a good command in the Norwegian language. Resources targeted to these students usually take the form of 
instruction support for these students in ordinary classes. Further, a fundamental goal in the integration policy 
has been that physically, mentally and emotionally disabled students should go to the same schools and be in the 
same classrooms as ordinary students. According to the school act, such students shall be allocated extra 
resources based on individual education plans to be designed in an interaction between teachers, parents and 
specialists on disabled students. These resources usually take the form of additional instructional support in the 
classroom (provided by an extra teacher and/or teacher assistants) and additional equipment (computers, special 
learning materials etc.). There are no special formal certification requirements for these teachers. The extent and 
type of the extra resources depends on the type of disability the student possesses. For the more severe physical 
and mental disabilities, the classification of a student as special needs student is relatively straightforward.  In the 
case of mild emotional disabilities the student has to undergo tests undertaken by psychologists and health 
specialists in order to get extra resources. The local government takes the final classification decision. 
 9
among the grades within primary and lower secondary education. We expect α1>0 due to the 
discussion above. SC describes the student composition and reflects the composition of the 
classes since all types of students are integrated in ordinary classes. In this paper, we will 
include the share of students from ethnic minorities and the share of students with special 
needs as measures of the student composition. Both variables are expected to increase the 
demand of teachers. The vector Z is a vector of other school characteristics, K is a constant, 
λjt are time specific local government fixed effects, and ε is a stochastic error term. 
 
3.2. Teacher supply 11 
Two types of decisions of individuals certified as teachers determine teacher supply towards a 
specific school; whether or not to work as a teacher in the geographic area, and which school 
to join. The first decision presumably depends on the wage and working conditions the 
teacher can get in another job (or income as a non-participant in the labour market) relative to 
that in teaching, and the probability of getting another job. The decision to choose a specific 
school, conditional on having decided to participate as a teacher, depends on the wage and 
working conditions on that school relative to the wage and working conditions in other 
schools.  
 
The textbook approach provides a useful point of departure. In the case of varying wage 
levels across schools, Wijt, the outcome of the decisions of the teachers can be summarized in 
a supply equation: 
 
1 2 3 4ln ln ln
LS LS LS
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt jt ijtLS K b W b P b SC b Z λ ε= + + + + + +                  (3)
    
In a flexible wage world the effects of student composition can be identified from estimating a 
wage equation (the inverse of (3)) while conditioning on the number of teacher positions. This 
approach cannot be pursued in the present case, which is characterized by a rigid nationally 
determined wage rate. Wage differences will no longer inform teachers where to supply their 
labour. In traditional fixed-price models one usually takes the realized and observed quantity 
as determined by the short side in the market. According to this approach, when teacher 
                                                 
11Different components of teacher supply have previously been analyzed in various settings. Zabalza (1979) and 
Dolton and Mavromaras (1994) investigate determinants of entering and leaving the teaching profession, 
Hanushek et al. (1999) discusses teacher mobility, while Murnane and Olsen (1990), Dolton and van der Klaauw 
(1995) and Gritz and Theobald (1996) focus on the length of stay in teaching.  
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supply falls short of demand, the actual number of teachers employed is determined by the 
supply side, which is the only quantity observed. A main weakness regarding this approach is 
that the underlying behavioural supply relationships are assumed to be equal to those in the 
flex-price world, with the only exception that prices are non-flexible. A more realistic 
treatment would be to assume that in the absence of wage differences suppliers react to 
quantity signals. Teachers may take into account the probability and extent of rationing when 
deciding where to supply their labour.12 An increase in resources to a school may increase the 
probability that an application will result in a job offer. This suggests that the higher are 
resources in a school, everything else constant, the higher is the number of teachers offering 
themselves for work in that school. 
 
To capture the effect of quantity signals on supply behaviour, a quantity signal, F, is included 
in the supply equation instead of the wage signal. 
 
1 2 3 4ln ln
LS LS LS
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt jt ijtLS K b F b P b SC b Z λ ε= + + + + + +        (4) 
 
The share of minority students and the share of students with special needs can affect teacher 
supply through two channels. First, these types of students will, other things equal, require 
more effort from teachers than other children, which is likely to have a negative effect on 
teacher supply. Some US studies provide indirect evidence on this relationship for some 
student groups. Gritz and Theobald (1996) find that “teachers are less likely to remain in 
districts that enroll high percentages of minority students and students living in poverty, or in 
districts that are located away from urban areas” (p. 498). Using data on teacher transitions 
between Texas schools, Hanushek et al. (1999) provides strong evidence that teachers favour 
non-minority schools. Further, Ballou and Podgursky (1998) find that the lower the share of 
minority students in the school, the more school principals are satisfied with their teachers. 
Although the level of ethnic fragmentation in Norway is far from that in the US, this evidence 
suggests that the share of minority students has a negative effect on the supply of teachers.13 
 
                                                 
12 Eaton and Quandt (1983) apply a similar approach in a macroeconomic model of labour supply. 
13 As it has become evident that individuals with minority background tend to have more social problems (higher 
rate of unemployment, lower wages, higher criminal rate and lower education), policies designed to integrate 
minority people into the society and provide better schooling opportunities have been high on the political 
agenda in Norway. Barth et al. (2002) provide evidence on the assimilation of immigrants into the Norwegian 
labour market. 
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In addition to this direct effect, a large share of students from ethnic minorities or with special 
needs induces the local government to allocate extra resources to the schools in various forms. 
According to national regulations in Norway, teachers of minority students or students with 
special needs have lower workloads (fewer hours in the classroom) than other teachers.14 If 
these extra resources partially reduce the required effort by the teachers, the supply of 
teachers will increase. To identify the direct relationship between teacher supply and student 
composition it is important to include in the supply equation a variable representing the 
resource use at school. The same problem has faced researchers analysing the relationship 
between teacher wages and student composition. In some of these studies, the student-teacher 
ratio has been used as a measure of working conditions in the wage equation, e.g., Kenny and 
Denslow (1980), Eberts and Stone (1985) and Levinson (1988). The underlying argument is 
that teachers are assumed to favour schools with good working conditions; thus, reduced class 
size increases teacher supply and reduces equilibrium wages. Using the same type of 
argument, we include the number of teacher education hours per student, U/P, as a separate 
variable in the teacher supply equation. Higher U/P may imply smaller class size or larger 
possibilities to divide classes into smaller groups with separate teachers.  
 
While the discussion above suggests that U/P should be included to capture variations in 
working conditions, U/P may also serve as a quantity signal, F, included in equation (4). We 
do not attempt to discriminate between these two mechanisms through which U/P affects 
supply, but both mechanisms imply that it is important to include this variable in order to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of student composition since school resources are 
positively correlated with the measures of student composition used. 
 
The time specific local government fixed effects included in (4) capture the effect of local 
private sector wages, labour market conditions, local living costs, the size of the local 
government budget, and other local government specific variables. A particular reason why 
this specification is warranted is that both observed and unobserved local government 
variables are likely to be among the determinants of the student composition in an area. For 
instance, minority parents may move into an area because of favourable economic conditions 
in that area. Including time-varying local government fixed effects effectively captures the 
effect of all such mechanisms. In addition, all national variables affecting the supply of 
                                                 
14 To illustrate, according to the national contract a fulltime teacher instructing only special needs or minority 
students can obtain a maximum reduction in instructional hours; i.e. hours spent in the classroom, by 16 percent. 
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teachers such as national labour market conditions are effectively captured by this 
specification. 
 
3.3. Endogeneity issues 
So far we have implicitly assumed that student composition affects teacher demand and 
supply, and not the reverse. However, if the choice of location of parents responds to teacher 
quality, and thereby teacher supply and demand, student composition is endogenous in the 
teacher supply and demand equations. It may be argued that since teachers can move between 
schools at relatively low costs within a community, while students are able to change schools 
only by changing residence, the endogeneity problem is of less importance. However, many 
families move at least once when they have children, and the quality of schools may be an 
important determinant in their location decision. Further, since teachers’ choice of school and 
parents’ choice of residence may partly depend on the same unobserved variables, student 
composition may be correlated with unobserved factors at the school level. Since the number 
of minority inhabitants is relatively easy to observe, while information on the number of 
students with special needs in an area is much more difficult to obtain, it may be reasonable to 
assume that the endogeneity problem due to parental sorting is most relevant for the share of 
minority students. On the other hand, sorting of parents may be more of a problem with 
special needs students than minority students because special needs students are wealthier on 
average. A particular reason why the share of special needs students may be endogenous is 
the fact that the teacher plays an important role in the process of classifying potential students 
as special needs students or not. If certified and non-certified teachers have different 
propensities to classify a student, this variable may be correlated with the error term.  
 
One strategy to reduce the possible bias due to parental sorting and omitted variables is to add 
school specific effects in the model, removing the effect of all school specific variables that 
are constant over time.  However, this strategy also has some important limitations. First, if 
the variation in student composition is much larger between schools than within schools over 
time, which typically is the case, there may simply not be enough information left to obtain a 
school fixed effects estimator with a reasonable signal to noise ratio. Second, the school fixed 
effects approach implicitly assumes that the unobserved variables causing correlation between 
the error term and the student composition are constant over time, which may not be a 
realistic assumption. 
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The second strategy is to use an instrumental variable approach. We use a particular event in 
the immigration history to suggest a relevant instrument for the effect of the share of minority 
students. In the aftermath of the war in former Yugoslavia, a number of refugees from this 
area arrived in Norway and applied for political asylum. Most of these refugees were placed 
in provisional camps or given temporary residence throughout the country. The local 
governments were required to integrate school age children of the refugees in ordinary public 
schools. This means that some schools randomly experienced a  sudden increase in the share 
of minority students. A particular feature of our data set is that we have information on the 
number of minority students with parents speaking the different languages in former 
Yugoslavia. If the distribution of refugees from former Yugoslavia across schools is 
uncorrelated with unobserved variables affecting teacher sorting, students with Bosnian or 
Albanian as their mother language can be used to generate valid instruments for the minority 
share.15 Table 2 provides information on these students during the period 1992-1999 and 
shows that a major increase in the number of students from former Yugoslavia occurred in 
1995-96. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
While certain events in the immigration history can be used to generate plausible instruments 
for the share of minority students, it seems much more difficult to find suitable instruments 
for the share of students with special needs. Since we already include time specific local 
government fixed effects, potential instruments must be school specific variables. One 
strategy is to investigate whether disaggregating the variable into different categories 
according to the severity of students’ learning disabilities changes the empirical results. 
However, this approach only addresses the potential correlation between teacher 
characteristics and classification practices and not endogeneity generated through sorting of 
families across schools. While this is admittedly crude ways to handle the problem, other 
types of data, which are not available for us, have to be used in order to address this issue in a 
more satisfactory way. 
 
Another variable that may be correlated with the error term in the supply equation is the 
resource use U/P because available resources and teacher supply potentially can be 
                                                 
15 The number of students from former Yugoslavia with another mother language (Serbian and Croatian) is 
negligible. 
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determined by the same unobserved variables even though we control for all variation at the 
local government level. Our approach is to use the national regulations on minimum teacher 
education hours UM to generate exogenous variation in U/P. Since UM is beyond the control 
of local politicians and school leaders it is a natural candidate to choose as instrument. It 
should be noted that UM is generated in a manner very similar to the class size function 
following from the Maimonides’ rule in Israel used as an instrument for actual class size in 
Angrist and Lavy (1999). 
 
 
4. Data 
 
The sample consists of all Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools for the school 
years 1995/1996 – 1999/2000, and is based on information collected by the Ministry of 
Education in Grunnskolens Informasjonssystem. The data include information at the school 
level of for example school type, schools size, the number of full-time equivalent teachers of 
different kinds, the number of classes, the number of teacher educational hours at school, and 
information on the student composition. While most of the information is available since the 
school year 1992/93, information on the number of teachers is only available from 1995/96.  
 
In this paper we exclude schools not owned by local governments and schools labelled 
“special schools”, accounting for 3 percent of the original sample. In the first year of the 
sample  there is 3218 schools remaining in the sample. This number is reduced to 3184 in the 
last year in the sample, mainly because of closing of small schools, yielding a total of 16014 
observations. In 172 of these observations some of the variables used in the analysis below 
are missing, The number of schools varies considerably between local governments. There are 
about 120 schools in Oslo, while about seven percent of the local governments have only one 
single school. At mean there are 7.3 schools per local government in 1999/2000.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 3. In about 46 
percent of the observations, all teachers are certified, that is, Q=1. Thus, there is excess 
demand of teachers in more than half of the schools, for which we can measure teacher 
supply. The distribution of Q, conditional on Q<1, is shown in Figure 2.16 Most schools with 
                                                 
16 Cases with Q=0 (21 observations) are excluded from the analysis in order to use a logarithmic specification of 
the dependent variables. 
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excess demand have Q within 0.9-1.0, but quite a large number of schools have Q<0.9, at 
mean for schools with excess demand, Q is below 0.9. 
 
Figures 2–5 about here 
 
The distribution of school size is illustrated in Figure 3. Almost 30 percent of the schools have 
less than 60 students, while about 15 percent of the students are in schools with more than 400 
students. The average school has 164 students and 14.6 full-time equivalent teachers, but the 
variation is large.17 
 
Figures 4 and 5 display the variation in the measures of student composition. The average 
share of minority students is four percent, but almost 40 percent of the schools have no 
minority students. The distribution of the share of minority students, excluding schools 
without minority students, is shown in Figure 4. In most schools, the share of minority 
students is quite low, reflecting, to some extent, the central government’s policy of spreading 
foreign refugees equally throughout the country. The percentage of students with special 
needs is about seven percent at mean, and the distribution is shown in Figure 5. While the 
share of minority students are larger in schools with excess demand than in schools without 
excess demand, the share of students with special needs are almost the same at average at 
these two types of schools. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In this section the estimated results for the teacher supply, the teacher demand, and the teacher 
quality equations are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. To simplify the 
presentation, the tables contain the results for a limited set of variables. The complete results 
for the baseline specifications are presented in Appendix Table A1. All results subsequently 
referred to in footnotes are available on request. 
5.1. Teacher supply 
Since teacher supply is only observed in the case of excess demand, a truncated or censored 
regression model is appropriate to recover a structural interpretation. Estimation results from 
                                                 
17 Because there are many small schools, we will investigate the robustness of the empirical results with respect 
to school size. 
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such a model are presented below. There are, however, at least two important shortcomings of 
such models in our setting. Including fixed effects to control for omitted variables yields 
biased estimates because the fixed effects are not asymptotically independent of the other 
coefficients in non-linear models as first noted in the seminal paper of Neyman and Scott 
(1948). In addition, there are no obvious ways of how to handle endogenous variables. 
 
The results from estimating the baseline model (4) by the Tobit specification using all schools 
are presented in column (1) in Table 4,18 while the results using ordinary least squares on the 
sample of schools where teacher supply is observed are presented in column (2).  The share of 
minority students has a significantly negative effect on the supply of certified teachers in both 
models. The results suggest that a school with no minority students has 17 log points higher 
supply of certified teachers than a school where all students belong to minorities.  Thus, the 
share of minority students seems to be an important factor behind teacher supply variations 
across schools, and the quantitative impact is independent of estimation method.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
On the other hand, the estimated supply effect of the share of students with special needs is 
positive, although not significant at five percent level in the Tobit specification. Compared to 
our prior expectations, the finding that school attractiveness seems to be positively related to 
the share of students with special needs is surprising. One possible explanation is that the 
variable capturing school resources per student, teacher education hours per student, is not 
sufficient to capture the actual change in allocated school resources associated with changes 
in the share of students with special needs. A rise in the share of students with special needs 
may also induce the local government to allocate extra resources in the form of assistants and 
technical equipment to the school. If these extra resources make the school more attractive for 
the teachers, in ways not measured in the model, this will bias the estimated effect of special 
needs students on teacher supply upwards. In addition, the propensity to classify children to 
have special needs may be linked to the credential of the teachers. Since the initiatives to 
classify special needs students can come from the individual teachers, this may be more 
                                                 
18 The model includes local government – year specific effects which may bias the coefficients in the Tobit 
model due to few observations used to estimate each fixed effect. To get an indication on the magnitude of this 
bias, the model has also been estimated including only time invariant local government fixed effects. In this case 
36.4 observations are on average used to estimate each fixed effect in contrast to 7.3 observations in the baseline 
model. The results were almost identical to those reported in Table 4, for example the effect of the minority 
share was -0.172 with the same standard error. 
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pronounced in classes with certified teachers than in classes with non-certified teachers. This 
motivates the classification of students with special needs with respect to learning disabilities 
done below. Nevertheless, taken at faced values, the result implies that teachers handling 
students with special needs are overcompensated through the implied workload reduction 
since teachers instructing special needs students spend less hours in the classroom than other 
teachers. Unfortunately, no information is available on the actual workload reduction besides 
the maximum amount of 16 percent.19 
 
The measure of school resources, the number of teacher education hours per student, has a 
strong positive effect. The results in column (1) indicate that ten percent increase in the 
number of teacher education hours per student increases the supply of certified teachers per 
student by 7.5 percent.  
 
Since the effect of the variables of interest are similar at least in economic terms using OLS 
on the sample of schools with observed supply and using the Tobit specification on all 
schools, it seems that the sample with observed supply is a reasonable representation of the 
population of schools. Thus, we will use the sample of observed supply to investigate whether 
the baseline results are biased due to omitted variables and endogenous variables. As outlined 
in section 3.4, the student composition variables may be correlated with the error term even if 
the effect of all school district variables are taken care of by time specific local government 
fixed effects. To reduce the potential biases resulting from such correlations, column (3) in 
Table 4 presents the results when school fixed effects are added to the baseline model. While 
reducing the estimated size of the effect of student composition somewhat, the effect of the 
minority share is still significant at ten percent level. The effect of the share of students with 
special needs, however, is still positive, but now clearly insignificant. It is worth noting that in 
this specification, the student composition effects are identified solely by within school 
variation over time and hence the signal to noise ratio may be low. 
 
While the above results are suggestive on the student composition impact on teacher supply, 
the estimated effects may nevertheless suffer from bias due to correlation between the error 
                                                 
19 If the actual workload reduction is about 10 percent, and if teacher supply is unitary elastic with respect  to 
workload reduction, the workload reduction can only account for about half of the estimated positive effect of 
special needs students on teacher supply. On the other hand, using the same assumptions for the effect of 
minority students, implies that in the absence of workload reduction, an increase in the share of minority students 
from zero to unity would lead to about 27 log points increase in teacher supply, suggesting that the current policy 
accounts for roughly one third of the apparent net costs on teachers. 
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term and the regressors. To further handle the potential endogeneity of the minority share, we 
estimate the model by two stage least squares as discussed above. Column (4) in Table 4 
presents the results when the share of minority students is instrumented by the share and 
number of students with Bosnian and Albanian as their mother language. The test for 
overidentifying restrictions provides evidence that the instruments are valid, even though this 
test is weak when the source of the variation in the instruments is similar as in our case. The 
first-stage results presented in Table A2 in the appendix suggest that the instruments are able 
to explain a substantial proportion of the variation in the minority share.20 In this model, the 
numerical size of the effect of the share of minority students is higher than when estimating 
the model with OLS. Since parental mobility is expected to bias the OLS–result of the 
minority share away from zero, this indicates that if the OLS–result is biased, it is due to 
omitted variables. However, the difference between the OLS–results and the 2SLS–results is 
only about one standard deviation. 
 
The results for the model where both the share of minority students and teacher education 
hours per student are instrumented are presented in column (5) in Table 4, where the centrally 
decided minimum level of teacher education hours is included as an instrument for total 
teacher education hours as motivated in Section 3.4. This model formulation actually 
strengthens the estimated negative effect of minority students on teacher supply. Because the 
effect of resource use can be seen as identified by a discontinuity rule, it is important to 
adequately control for the effect of the variable that generates the discontinuity as argued by 
Angrist and Lavy (1999). Because we use data at the school level and not the grade level in 
the analysis, it is impossible to fully control for enrolment by using the rule underlying the 
instrument as in Angrist and Lavy (1999). But including a full set of dummy variables for 
school size does not alter the results reported in Table 4.21 
 
                                                 
20 Using only one of the instruments yields similar results. Using only the share (number) of students with 
Bosnian and Albanian as their mother language, the effect of the minority share is -0.188 (-0.237) and significant 
at five percent level. The same holds for the teacher demand and teacher quality models reported below. One 
may be concerned that the distribution of the refugees only was random in 1995, the year of the large inflow (see 
Table 2), even though the mobility of the refugees are low the first few years in the country. Using only the 1995 
distribution as instrument, the effect of the minority share is -0.195 and significant at five percent level. 
Interacting the instruments with year dummies does not alter the result. This indicates that it is the initial 
distribution that matters. To further investigate the robustness of the results, we added school fixed effects to the 
model. As expected, this made the effect of minority share small and insignificant since the share of Bosnian and 
Albanian students shows much less within–school variation than the minority share itself.   
21 In a model with dummy variables for the number of students (782 variables), the effect of the minority share is 
equal to –0.32 and highly significant. 
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As discussed in Section 3.4, it is very hard to find any compelling school specific instruments 
for the share of students with special needs. One simple approach is to split the students with 
special needs into the three different categories of the severity of their learning disabilities as 
reported in the original data. The data divide the students into categories for major, moderate 
and mild learning disabilities.22 The model in column (6) in Table 3 clearly indicates that the 
positive supply effect of special needs students does not depend in any systematic way on the 
severity of the learning disabilities they possess.23 The fact that the positive effect is at least as 
strong for the major disabled as for the mildly disabled suggests that the classification policy 
does not depend in any systematic way on teacher characteristics since systematic 
classification should be of little importance for the major disabled. Using the share of students 
with major learning disabilities as an instrument for the share of special needs students 
actually increased the estimate of special needs students, although the effect was imprecisely 
estimated.  
 
Since there are no national regulations requiring special needs students to be instructed by 
certified teachers, it is unlikely that the positive effect of the share of students with special 
needs is driven by some mechanical relationship between special needs students and certified 
teachers.  Another possible explanation of the positive effect of special needs students is that 
families with disabled children are more likely to sort themselves across schools than other 
families and that they selectively choose schools with generous treatment of special needs 
students. If teachers also for some unobserved reason systematically choose such schools, this 
could lead to a spurious positive effect. Fixed school effects should capture much of this 
sorting behaviour, and may explain why the effect of the special needs share is smaller in the 
model including such effects. Summing up, it is fair to conclude that it is difficult to obtain 
robust results or compelling interpretations regarding the effect of the share of students with 
special needs on teacher sorting. On the other hand, the effect of the share of minority 
students seems to be robust to how the share of students with special needs is handled.24   
                                                 
22 The categories are defined by the level of extra resources allocated. Students with major learning disabilities, 
measured both in physical and mental terms, is defined as those receiving 360 or more extra teacher education 
hours per year. Students with moderate and mild learning disabilities receive 101–360 and less than 101 extra 
teacher education hours, respectively. 
23 Estimating the model only including the share of students with major learning disabilities, the effect of this 
variable is equal to 0.22 and significant at five percent level, while the other variables in the model have 
practically equal effects as in the models in columns (2) and (6) in Table 4. We have also estimated a model 
completely excluding all variables measuring students with special needs, yielding unchanged effects of the 
other variables.  
24 Various robustness checks of the baseline model have been undertaken. First, to check for the sensitivity of the 
results with respect to outliers, we estimated the model excluding schools with extreme values of the student 
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While the results above indicate that student composition does seem to affect the sorting of 
teachers between schools within school districts, it is of interest to know whether such sorting 
also takes place between school districts. To investigate this issue, column (7) in Table 3 
reports the results from an aggregated model using time-variable local government weighted 
means of the variables.25 Within this model, only variation across local governments is 
utilized, and the effect of student composition is much smaller and insignificant. One possible 
interpretation is that teachers respond to variation in the share of minority students by moving 
mainly within, and not between school districts. Obviously, local governments do not 
necessarily correspond to job and residence markets.26 Nevertheless, teachers moving 
between local governments need to change residence to larger extent than teachers switching 
schools within a local government. However, another possibility is that the between district 
variation in student composition is simply too low to allow identification of the impact using 
data aggregated to the district level. 
  
 
5.2. Teacher demand 
As discussed in Section 2, teacher demand is observed in the case of excess supply, while 
interpreting the total number of teachers in the case of excess demand as teacher demand is 
only valid under certain assumptions. Column (1) in Table 5 contains the estimation results 
for the variables of interest using Tobit on the whole sample, while column (2) contains the 
                                                                                                                                                        
composition variables. As Figures 4 and 5 show, in some few schools all students belong to minorities and in 
some schools all students have special needs. Excluding these schools from the sample gave only minor changes 
in the baseline results (the effect of the minority share and the share of students with special needs are equal to –
0.16 and 0.14, respectively). Second, as Oslo is the far largest city in the country and also has a share of minority 
inhabitants far above the other parts of the country, we estimated the model excluding Oslo from the sample. 
This did neither affect the results (the effect of the minority share and the share of students with special needs are 
equal to –0.18 and 0.21, respectively). Third, because there are a large number of small schools, one may be 
concerned that small special schools drive the results. By estimating the model using only schools with more 
than 350 students (1023 observations), the effects of the minority share changes little (the effect of the minority 
share and the share of students with special needs are equal to –0.16 and 0.09, respectively, and the former effect 
is significant at five percent level). Finally, one may be concerned that Q is marginally below unity in some 
cases simply because of noise. In a model only including schools with Q<0.9 (2910 observations), the effect of 
the minority share is –0.18 and significant, while the effect of the share of students with special needs is 0.15 and 
insignificant. 
25 Notice that when the data are aggregated to the local government level, Q<1 even though there is excess 
demand only in the smallest school in the local government. In addition, given that the supply relationship is 
truncated in the data and thereby non-linear, it can in principle not easily be aggregated across schools. To 
exclude local governments with a very minor use of non-certified teachers, the model in column (7) in Table 4 
are based on a sample where the mean of Q is less than 0.98. To take account of local labour market conditions 
and local fiscal conditions, we included county dummies, log of district population size and the share of 
population living in rural areas as additional regressors in the model. 
26 Statistics Norway has recently constructed 90 job market areas based on information of worker commuting 
from the 1990 Census. On average, these areas consist of 4-5 local governments.  
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OLS results for the model estimated on the excess supply sample only. In column (3) the 
OLS-results for the model using the whole sample are shown. The share of minority students 
has a strong positive effect in all specifications. Comparing a school with no minority students 
with a school where all students belong to minorities, the latter school demands between 60 
and 90 log points more full-time equivalent teachers. The share of students with special needs 
has an even stronger effect. These results are in accordance with the national regulations on 
school resource allocation discussed in Section 3.1, which implies extra instructional support 
for these student groups. In particular, the results show that the effect of the student 
composition measures is well above the pure effect of reduced workload for teachers 
instructing these students. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The minimum teacher education hours per students has a strong positive effect. This variable 
capture to a large extent school size because the minimum hours are highly negatively related 
to the number of students.27  
 
All coefficients in the Tobit model are larger than in the OLS models. When we in the 
following estimate linear models, the results may be seen as conservative estimates. The main 
assumption underlying the estimated model in Column (3) in Table 5 is that central 
regulations on class size and educational hours per grade, combined with support for certain 
student categories, are the main determinants of teacher demand. A potential objection is that 
the number of teachers hired may depend on teacher quality and hence on teacher supply. If 
this is the case, one is only able to identify demand for certified teachers when there is excess 
supply. A simple way to address the importance of this issue is to compare the parameters of 
interest between the models in column (2) and (3) in Table 5. It turns out that the estimated 
parameters are very similar in economic terms across the models.28 This indicates that the 
                                                 
27 Even in the present specification of the model, there is a negative effect of the number of students, implying 
some economics of scale. Excluding the minimum teacher education hours from the model, all variables have the 
same effect except the number of students which gets a much larger effect in absolute term In this model 
specification, ten percent increase in the number of students increases the number of full-time equivalent 
teachers by 8.1 percent, which reflects substantial economics of scale in schools. It should be noted that this 
result only applies to schools with more than 60 students because dummy variables are included for schools 
below this size. 
28 Even though the variables of interest seem to have equal effects in economic terms, they differ in statistical 
terms. A formal test of the null hypothesis of equal effects of the parameters reported in column (2) and (3) in 
Table 5 is rejected by an F-test at one percent level. Equal effects of all variables of the model are also strongly 
rejected by an F-test, which should be of no surprise since the model includes 2200 parameters. 
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demand function for certified teachers is identified not only in the case of excess supply, but 
also when the schools have to hire non-certified teachers. 
 
In the model with fixed school effects, presented in column (4) in Table 5, the effect of 
student composition clearly drops in numerical value. While this may indicate an upward bias 
in the previously estimated effects, another possibility is that it takes some time for schools to 
respond to short-term changes in student composition. Although the use of fixed school 
effects may reduce the potential problems with correlation between the student composition 
variables and the error term, we also investigate this issue by estimating the demand model 
with the minority share instrumented. The results, shown in column (5) in Table 5, are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline model.29 The low p-value on the test for overidentifying 
restrictions, however, suggests that the sum of Bosnian and Albanian students has a separate 
effect on teacher demand. This is not surprising because these students, who arrived directly 
from an area with massive violence, are likely to require a closer following up than other 
minority students. 
 
As in the analysis of teacher supply, we lastly split the students with special needs into three 
categories. As expected, the different categories have significantly different impacts on 
teacher demand. Students with major, moderate and mild disabilities demand 167, 90 and 44 
log points more teachers, respectively, than students without special needs. Notice that the 
effects of the other variables in the model are basically unchanged compared to the baseline 
specification.  
 
5.3. Teacher quality 
The supply and demand analyses give clear predictions on how different variables influence 
excess demand, which is our measure of teacher quality Q. Nevertheless, a separately 
estimated model for Q is instructive because this approach may hinge to a smaller degree on 
identification via the institutional set-up as described in Section 2. Q is a truncated variable, 
and Deaton (1997) and Angrist (2000) argue that the choice of estimation method in this case 
depends on how one wants to interpret the estimated results. If one is interested in the share of 
certified teachers, which is what Q actually measures, it is appropriate to use linear methods 
                                                 
29 Estimating this model only using observations of excess demand, the effect of the minority share, special 
needs share, and minimum teacher education hours per student are equal to  0.77, 0.93 and 0.69, respectively, 
close to the results reported. 
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because this variable cannot exceed unity. The mass point of Q=1 in this case comes about 
because it is impossible that a ratio exceeds unity, and estimation of an average effect requires 
that both observations where Q=1 and Q<1 are included in the analysis. On the other hand, if 
Q is interpreted as the supply of certified teachers per teacher position, as discussed in Section 
2, the index of teacher quality will exceed unity in the case of excess supply. There is 
censoring of the data, and it is appropriate to use the Tobit method. In this case, changes in the 
student composition will not only influence teacher quality in schools with excess demand, 
but also in schools with excess supply. Moreover, a reasonable assumption may be that 
schools that are able to hire many certified teachers also are able to hire such teachers with 
other valuable characteristics. This suggests that the variation in the ratio of certified to total 
number of teachers understates quality variation. Thus, the average effect of student 
composition will be stronger when Q is interpreted as a censored variable than when Q is 
strictly interpreted as a ratio.  A conservative strategy in this case is to rely on linear 
estimation methods, which is our basic approach in the following, but for completeness we 
also report the results from a Tobit specification.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The results of several specifications of the teacher quality function are reported in Table 5.  
Column (1) presents the baseline model, estimated by OLS and with the student composition 
measures entered as exogenous variables. The effect of the minority share is significantly 
negative with a coefficient of –0.17, close to the effect in the supply model. To get an idea of 
how much of the variation in teacher quality this does explain, the result implies that one 
standard deviation decrease in the share of minority students leads to an increase in teacher 
quality by approximately 0.15 standard deviations. This is an average effect over both schools 
for which it is possible to change Q and schools where Q=1. The effect of the share of 
students with special needs is close to zero, indicating that the demand and supply effects are 
of qualitative equal magnitude. Regarding the effect of minimum education hours, the effect 
is negative, indicating that the effect is larger on demand than on supply.30  
 
                                                 
30 Restricting the sample only to schools with above 350 students (1575 observations) does not alter the baseline 
results; the effects of the minority share, the share of students with special needs, and minimum teacher 
education hours per student are equal to –0.25, -0.02, and -0.05, respectively, and the former effect is significant 
at five percent level  
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Column (2) in Table 6 extends the model by including school fixed effects. While the effect 
of the minority share decreases in numerical terms, the effect is still sizeable and significant. 
In this specification, the effect of the share of students with special needs is significantly 
negative. Column (3) shows the 2SLS results when the share of minority students is 
instrumented. The estimated effects are fairly close to those obtained using OLS, and the test 
of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid. Column (4) in Table 5 
presents the results from a model where the share of special needs students is separated in 
three groups as before. None of the groups alter teacher quality significantly. 
 
Finally, Table 6 reports the results from estimating the model by the Tobit specification. As 
expected, the effects of the measures of student composition increase when Q is interpreted as 
a censored variable instead of being naturally truncated. A possible interpretation is that 
reduced minority share increases the number of applicants and thereby increases teacher 
quality not only in schools with excess demand which can increase the share of certified 
teachers, but also in schools with excess supply because they can choose teachers from a 
larger pool. In this model, the effect of the share of students with special needs is negatively 
significant, indicating that the positive demand effect dominates the positive supply effect. 
 
It is of interest to compare the estimated relationship between teacher quality and student 
composition with the relationship implied by the estimated supply and demand equations 
above. The predicted effect on minority share (special needs share) based on the fixed school 
effects specifications is –0.22 (-0.13), compared to the estimate of -0.12 (-0.11) in the reduced 
form teacher quality model in Table 6.31 Larger predicted effects than estimated effects is 
consistent with the argument above that linear models of teacher quality yield conservative 
estimates because the prediction is made from models with continuous dependent variables. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Educational markets are characterized by sorting. While most researchers have been occupied 
with the residential sorting that takes place on the demand side of the market, the current 
                                                 
31 When making these calculations we assume that the effect of student composition on teacher education hours 
per student is equal to the effect on teacher demand per student. 
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paper focuses on sorting on the supply side. Sorting on the supply side is determined by the 
interaction between supply and demand in the teacher labour market.  
 
Our empirical analysis departs from an analytical framework that focuses on teacher supply 
directed towards specific schools, and the teacher demand generated by the same schools 
within a rationed teacher labour market. The data, which allow separate estimations of the 
supply and demand equations, come from the Norwegian elementary school system, 
characterized by a common pay schedule and a high degree of national regulation of local 
governments. The empirical analysis reveals that certified teachers prefer schools with native 
students, and that the demand for certified teachers is positively related to the shares of 
students from ethnic minorities and the share of students with special needs. Our study also 
suggests that teacher sorting mainly takes place within communities. 
 
The econometric analysis addresses the question that teacher demand and supply responses to 
student characteristics may trigger residential sorting by using the large inflow of Albanian 
and Bosnian refugees in the mid-nineties to generate instrumental variables for the share of 
students from ethnic minorities. The result that supply of certified teachers is decreasing in the 
share of minority students seems robust to the use of IV-methods. Further, the results are 
qualitatively the same when a fixed school effect specification is estimated. Using excess 
demand for teachers as a measure of teacher quality, the results also show that teacher quality 
is systematically lower in schools with large shares of minority students.  
 
The evidence of sorting in the teacher labour market casts doubt on the effectiveness of a 
completely centralized wage-setting system. For several decades, individual Norwegian 
schools and local governments have not been allowed to use the wage mechanism to improve 
the quality of the teachers. This is likely to have two different types of costs. First, if the use 
of non-certified teachers does not compensate for the lower supply of certified teachers in 
quality terms, and if teacher quality is important in education production, minority students 
receive lower quality education than native students. This quality reduction adds to the other 
costs of providing education in schools with high minority share. Second, schools with excess 
supply may be in the situation of paying a higher wage than necessary for a given teacher 
quality. 
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Another policy conclusion to be drawn from our study is that the possibility of teacher sorting 
should be taken into account in the present debate on parental school choice. If increased 
parental school choice increases student segregation along ethnic lines in the first place, 
unwanted effects on the distribution of education benefits and human capital can be reinforced 
through the teacher sorting mechanism identified in this paper – at least if policy makers 
choose to stick to a fixed wage structure. 
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Table 1. The relationship between student achievement and teacher certification 
Dependent variable, achievement in Reading  Mathematics  Science 
Log number of students 14.6 
(2.36) 
16.4 
(2.59) 
 4.85 
(0.84) 
7.05 
(1.20) 
 7.00 
(1.14) 
8.40 
(1.34) 
Student-teacher ratio -2.05 
(0.90) 
-1.96 
(0.78) 
 -1.13 
(0.52) 
-0.82 
(0.36) 
 -0.64 
(0.28) 
-0.46 
(0.18) 
Q 40.42 
(1.34) 
-  56.8 
(2.22) 
-  38.1 
(1.40) 
- 
Q=1 - 19.8 
(2.97) 
 - 16.2 
(2.50) 
 - 17.4 
(2.61) 
R2 0.06 0.09  0.06 0.05  0.03 0.05 
Number of schools 136 136  136 136  135 135 
Standard deviation of depended variable 39.7  36.0  38.5 
Correlation coefficient between 
dependent variable and Q 
0.19 [0.024]  0.16 [0.050]  0.28 [0.001] 
Note. All calculations are weighted by the number of students participating at each school in each test. The 
models in the first part of the table are estimated by OLS. Absolute standard errors corrected for White 
heteroscedasticity in parentheses and p-values in brackets. 
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Table 2. Minority students and immigrants from former Yugoslavia  
  Share of the minority students with mother language 
 Share of minority 
students 
Bosnian Albanian Bosnian + Albanian 
1992 0.026 0.001 0.014 0.014 
1993 0.029 0.001 0.016 0.017 
1994 0.033 0.002 0.028 0.030 
1995 0.035 0.107 0.053 0.160 
1996 0.036 0.113 0.058 0.171 
1997 0.038 0.102 0.060 0.161 
1998 0.040 0.097 0.056 0.153 
1999 0.044 0.081 0.074 0.155 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Sample All Q < 1  Q = 1 
 Mean Standard 
deviation
Mean Standard 
deviation 
 Mean Standard 
deviation
Log of teacher supply per student LS/P  -2.35 0.33 -2.40 0.31  -2.30 0.34 
Log of teacher demand per student LD/P -2.29 0.34 -2.28 0.34  -2.30 0.34 
Log of teacher quality Q -0.064 0.131 -0.120 0.159  0 - 
Minority share 0.038 0.078 0.047 0.089  0.028 0.062 
Special needs share 0.066 0.052 0.069 0.049  0.063 0.056 
Log teacher education hours per student 4.56  0.33  4.58  0.33   4.55  0.33  
Log minimum teacher education hours per 
student 
4.05 0.38 4.03 0.37  4.06 0.38 
Log number of students 4.67 1.07 4.79 1.04  4.53 1.09 
Change in the log number of students 0.036 0.145 0.040 0.141  0.031 0.153 
Number of students below 20 0.084 - 0.071 -  0.100 - 
Number of students between 20 and 60 0.194 - 0.166 -  0.227 - 
The school has a library 0.266 - 0.287 -  0.242 - 
Only students at the primary educational level, 
with separate classes at each grade 
0.360 - 0.369 -  0.349 - 
Only students at the lower secondary educational 
level, with separate classes at each grade 
0.148 - 0.156 -  0.139 - 
Students both at the primary and lower secondary 
educational level, with separate classes for each grade 
at the lower secondary educational level 
0.122 - 0.146 -  0.095 - 
Neither of the above mentioned school types 0.370 - 0.329 -  0.416 - 
School year 1995–96 0.200 - 0.172 -  0.234 - 
School year 1996–97 0.200 - 0.168 -  0.238 - 
School year 1997–98 0.199 - 0.210 -  0.187 - 
School year 1998–99 0.200 - 0.229 -  0.167 - 
School year 1999–2000 0.200 - 0.222 -  0.175 - 
Observations 15,842 8,481  7,361 
 
 32
Table 4. The teacher supply function. Dependent variable is the log of the supply of certified 
teachers per student LS/P 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)      (7) 
Data level  
School level 
 Local 
government 
levelb 
Sample All Q < 1 Q < 1 Q < 1 Q < 1 Q < 1  Q < 0.98 
Minority share -0.174 
(0.041)* 
-0.168 
(0.043)* 
-0.126 
(0.076) 
-0.221 
(0.066)* 
-0.302 
(0.064)* 
-0.166 
(0.029)* 
 -0.060 
(0.106) 
Special needs share  0.141 
(0.077) 
 0.201 
(0.077)* 
  0.087 
(0.072) 
 0.198 
(0.077)* 
 0.102 
(0.087) 
   -    0.063 
(0.099) 
Special needs share –Mild    -    -    -    -    -  0.212 
(0.071)* 
    - 
Special needs share - Moderate    -    -    -    -    -  0.177 
(0.073)* 
    - 
Special needs share – Major    -    -    -    -    -  0.277 
(0.105)* 
    - 
Log teacher education hours 
per student 
 0.750 
(0.021)* 
 0.869 
(0.022)* 
 0.646 
(0.023)* 
 0.876 
(0.022)* 
 0.969 
(0.037)* 
 0.870 
(0.013)* 
  0.777 
(0.032)* 
Local government – year 
specific effects 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   No 
School specific effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  No   No 
Estimation method  Tobit  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS   OLS 
Endogenous variable    -    -    - Minority 
share 
Minority 
share, Log 
teacher 
education 
hours per 
student 
   -     - 
Instrumentsa    -    -    - SBA, 
NBA 
UM, SBA, 
NBA 
   -      - 
OIR, p-value    -    -    -  0.210  0.221    -     - 
Observations  15 841  8 481  8 481  8 481  8 481  8 476   1 515 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and * 
denotes significance at five percent level. All models have the same specification except as indicated. In addition 
to the reported variables, the models include the log of the number of students, dummy variables for schools with 
less than 20 students and less than 60 students, the change in the log of the number of students, a dummy 
variable for whether the school has a library, and dummy variables for whether all of the students at the school 
are at the primary educational level with separate classes for each grade, whether all of the students at the school 
are at the lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade, or whether there are students at 
both the primary and lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade at the upper 
secondary education level. 
a SBA is the share of students with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian, NBA is the number of students 
with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian, and UM is the log of minimum teacher education hours per 
student. 
b The log of population size, the share of the population in rural areas, county specific effects, and time specific 
effects are included in the model.  
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Table 5. The teacher demand function. Dependent variable is the log of the teacher demand 
per student LD/P 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Sample  All  Q = 1  All All All  All 
Minority share  0.873 
(0.068)* 
 0.664 
(0.070)* 
 0.629 
(0.042)* 
 0.293 
(0.034)* 
 0.811 
(0.065)* 
 0.649 
(0.041)* 
Special needs share 1.091 
(0.086)* 
0.932 
(0.091)* 
1.005 
(0.069)* 
0.607 
(0.026)* 
 0.994 
(0.068)* 
   - 
Special needs share – Mild    -    -    -    -    -  0.441 
(0.048)* 
Special needs share – Moderate    -    -    -    -    -  0.904 
(0.059)* 
Special needs share – Major    -    -    -    -    -  1.673 
(0.231)* 
Log minimum teacher education hours 
per student 
 0.712 
(0.020)* 
 0.689 
(0.023)* 
 0.653 
(0.014)* 
 0.439 
(0.10)* 
 0.654 
(0.014)* 
 0.657 
(0.15)* 
Local government – year specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School specific effects  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Estimation method  Tobit  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS 
Endogenous variable    -    -    -    - Minority 
share 
   - 
Instrumentsa    -    -    -    - SBA, 
NBA 
   - 
OIR, p-value    -    -    -    -  0.034     - 
Observations  15 842  7 361  15 842 15 842 15 842  15 835 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and * 
denotes significance at five percent level. All models have the same specification except as indicated. In addition 
to the reported variables, the models include the log of the number of students, dummy variables for schools with 
less than 20 students and less than 60 students, the change in the log of the number of students, a dummy 
variable for whether the school has a library, and dummy variables for whether all of the students at the school 
are at the primary educational level with separate classes for each grade, whether all of the students at the school 
are at the lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade, or whether there are students at 
both the primary and lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade at the upper 
secondary education level. 
a SBA is the share of students with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian and NBA is the number of 
students with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian. 
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Table 6. The teacher quality function. Dependent variable is the log of teacher quality Q 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
Sample All  All All  All  All 
Minority share -0.174 
(0.029)* 
-0.124 
(0.038)* 
-0.264 
(0.041)* 
-0.171 
(0.029)* 
-0.285 
(0.034)* 
Special needs share -0.038 
(0.043) 
-0.110 
(0.029)* 
-0.032 
(0.043) 
   - -0.102 
(0.061) 
Special needs share – Mild    -    -    -  0.003 
(0.058) 
   - 
Special needs share – Moderate    -    -    - -0.077 
(0.065) 
   - 
Special needs share – Major    -    -    -  0.015 
(0.066) 
   - 
Log minimum teacher education hours 
per student 
-0.042 
(0.013)* 
-0.024 
(0.011)* 
-0.043 
(0.013)* 
-0.043 
(0.013)* 
-0.086 
(0.018)* 
Local government – year specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School specific effects  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  Tobit 
Endogenous variable    -    - Minority 
share 
   -    - 
Instrumentsa    -    - SBA, NBA    -    - 
OIR, p-value    -    -  0.768    -    - 
Observations  15 842  15 842  15 842  15 835 15 8542 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and * 
denotes significance at five percent level. All models have the same specification except as indicated. In addition 
to the reported variables, the models include the log of the number of students, dummy variables for schools with 
less than 20 students and less than 60 students, the change in the log of the number of students, a dummy 
variable for whether the school has a library, and dummy variables for whether all of the students at the school 
are at the primary educational level with separate classes for each grade, whether all of the students at the school 
are at the lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade, or whether there are students at 
both the primary and lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade at the upper 
secondary education level. 
a SBA is the share of students with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian and NBA is the number of 
students with mother language either Bosnian or Albanian. 
 35
 Appendix Table A1. Full models 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Dependent variable Log of teacher supply  
per student LS/P 
Log of teacher demand 
per student LD/P 
Log of teacher quality Q
Specification Column (1) 
in Table 4 
Column (2) 
in Table 4 
Column (2) 
in Table 5 
Column (3) 
in Table 5 
Column (1) 
in Table 6 
Column (5) 
in Table 6 
Minority share -0.174 
(0.041)* 
-0.168 
(0.043)* 
 0.664 
(0.070)* 
 0.629 
(0.042)* 
-0.174 
(0.029)* 
-0.285 
(0.034)* 
Special needs share  0.141 
(0.077) 
 0.201 
(0.077)* 
0.932 
(0.091)* 
1.005 
(0.069)* 
-0.038 
(0.043) 
-0.102 
(0.061) 
Log teacher education hours per student  0.750 
(0.021)*   -
 0.869 
(0.022)* 
   -    -    -    - 
Log minimum teacher education hours per student    -    -  0.689 
(0.023)* 
 0.653 
(0.014)* 
-0.042 
(0.013)*   - 
-0.086 
(0.018)*   - 
Log number of students -0.054 
(0.007)* 
-0.019 
(0.007)* 
-0.022 
(0.008)* 
-0.031 
(0.005)* 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.021 
(0.006)* 
Change in the log number of students -0.107 
(0.017)* 
-0.075 
(0.019)* 
-0.042 
(0.025) 
-0.049 
(0.015)* 
-0.042 
(0.010)* 
-0.067 
(0.015)* 
Number of students below 20 -0.084 
(0.020)* 
-0.165 
(0.023)* 
 0.036 
(0.015)* 
 0.039 
(0.012)* 
-0.071 
(0.012)* 
-0.103 
(0.017)* 
Number of students between 20 and 60 -0.021 
(0.010)* 
-0.042 
(0.011)* 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
 0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.005)* 
-0.023 
(0.009)* 
The school has a library -0.0042 
(0.005) 
 0.000 
(0.005 
 0.006 
(0.005) 
 0.014 
(0.003)* 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Only students at the primary educational level, 
with separate classes at each grade 
   -    -    -    -    -    - 
Only students at the lower secondary educational 
level, with separate classes at each grade 
 0.164 
(0.006)* 
 0.150 
(0.005)* 
 0.213 
(0.006)* 
 0.208 
(0.004)* 
 0.010 
(0.003)* 
 0.015 
(0.005)* 
Students both at the primary and lower secondary 
educational level, with separate classes for each 
grade at the lower secondary educational level 
 0.083 
(0.008)* 
 0.069 
(0.007)* 
 0.102 
(0.009)* 
 0.098 
(0.006)* 
 0.007 
(0.004) 
 0.009 
(0.007) 
Neither of the above mentioned school types 
 
 0.018 
(0.010) 
 0.026 
(0.009)* 
 0.025 
(0.010)* 
 0.025 
(0.007)* 
 0.004 
(0.005) 
 0.002 
(0.009) 
Local government – year specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School specific effects  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Estimation method  Tobit  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  Tobit 
Observations  15,842  8,481  7,361  15,842  15 842  15 842 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and * 
denotes significance at five percent level. 
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Table A2. First stage regressions. Dependent variable is specified in the second row 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Minority 
share 
Minority 
share 
Log teacher 
education hours 
per student 
Minority share 
Specification Column (4) 
in Table 3
Column (5) 
in Table 3
Column (5) in 
Table 3 
Column (5) in Table 4 
and column (3) in Table 5
Special needs share -0.032 
(0.021) 
0.063 
(0.021)* 
1.067 
(0.137)* 
0.047 
(0.013)* 
Log teacher education hours per student 0.087 
(0.011)* 
- - - 
Log minimum teacher education hours per 
student (UM) 
- -0.011 
(0.007) 
0.615 
(0.019)* 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Share of the students with mother language 
either Bosnian or Albanian (SBA) 
0.804 
(0.257)* 
0.879 
(0.278)* 
1.114 
(0.409)* 
1.155 
(0.259)* 
Number of the students with mother 
language either Bosnian or Albanian (NBA) 
0.0067 
(0.0016)* 
0.0072 
(0.0016)* 
0.0043 
(0.0014)* 
0.0058 
(0.0013)* 
Local government – year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test for the instruments 68.4 48.2 394.1 97.2 
Observations 8 481 8 481 8 481 15 842 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and * 
denotes significance at five percent level. All models have the same specification except as indicated. In addition 
to the reported variables, the models include the log of the number of students, dummy variables for schools with 
less than 20 students and less than 60 students, the change in the log of the number of students, a dummy 
variable for whether the school has a library, and dummy variables for whether all of the students at the school 
are at the primary educational level with separate classes for each grade, whether all of the students at the school 
are at the lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade, or whether there are students at 
both the primary and lower secondary educational level with separate classes for each grade at the upper 
secondary education level. 
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Figure 1. The teacher labour market and the identification strategy 
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Figure 2. Distribution of teacher quality Q, Q=1 excluded 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the number of students at school 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the minority share, schools without minority students are excluded 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the share of students with special needs 
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